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Semantic Criteria of Correct Formalization1 
 
Timm Lampert 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper compares several models of formalization. It articulates criteria of 
correct formalization and identifies their problems. All of the discussed criteria 
are so called “semantic” criteria, which refer to the interpretation of logical 
formulas. However, as will be shown, different versions of an implicitly applied 
or explicitly stated criterion of correctness depend on different understandings of 
“interpretation”  in this context.  
In particular, I will discuss the benefits and problems of the following criteria of 
correctness:  
 
 criterion of verbalization (CRVERB): (A) is a correct formalization of a 
proposition A if and only if a free verbalization of (A), V((A)), and A are 
equivalent (have the same meaning). 
 varying- criterion (VCR): (A) is a correct formalization of a 
proposition A if and only if the schematization of A, sch(A), and (A) have 
the same truth value relative to all interpretations / realizations. 
 fixed- criterion (FCR): (A) of a logical language L with a fixed 
interpretation ,  <L, >,   is a correct formalization of a proposition A if 
and only if (A) is an effective translation of A or of a rephrasing of A in 
respect to <L, >. 
 TC: (A) is a correct formalization of proposition A if and only if (A) and 
A have the same truth values with respect to all interpretations in terms of 
conditions of truth or falsehood of A that are suitable according to the 
realization. 
 TC': (A) is a correct formalization of a proposition A if and only if (A) 
and A have the same truth values with respect to suitable realizations. 
Realizations are suitable if and only if they do not restrict the space of 
possible interpretations in terms of conditions of truth and falsehood of A. 
 
I will argue that the formal representation of informal reasoning highly depends 
on the implicitly assumed notion of a correct formalization. This, I will 
demonstrate by referring to the so called “De Morgan argument” (“All horses 
are animals. Therefore: All heads of horses are heads of animals.”).  
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1. Introduction 
 
Logical formalization is a standard tool for reconstructing informal arguments as 
well as for the logical analysis of ordinary language. The question of identifying 
criteria for correct formalization arises as soon as one considers alternative 
formalizations. The recent debate on criteria of adequate formalization 
demonstrates that this question is more difficult to answer than one might 
suppose from the familiar practice of formalization, cf. Brun(2003) as well as 
Blau(1977), Epstein(1990), Epstein(1994), Sainsbury(1993), Löffler(2006), 
Kleinknecht(2008), Baumgartner/Lampert(2008) and Lampert/ 
Baumgartner(2010). In particular, two questions arise: (i) how should 
established formalizations be reconstructed?  and (ii) are the reasons underlying 
these formalizations persuasive? In this paper, these questions are discussed 
with respect to formalizations of the following well-known and allegedly trivial 
argument: 
 
Premise (P): Horses are animals. 
Conclusion (C): Heads of horses are heads of animals. 
 
This argument is used in standard textbooks of logic to prove the insufficiency 
of monadic predicate logic. It is called “De Morgan's Argument” although De 
Morgan never used it in this form, cf. Merrill(1977) and Brun(2003), p. 189, 
footnote 1. In this paper, I refer to the discussion of its established formalization, 
which can be found in standard textbooks of logic such as Copi(1979), p. 131f., 
Lemmon(1998), p. 131f., Quine(1982) p. 168, 173, 251 and Suppes(1999), p. 
93f. It is as follows: 
 
(P): x (Hx  Jx) 
(C): x(y (Hy  Ixy)  y(Jy  Ixy)) 
 
Realization 1: 
Hx: x is a horse. 
Jx: x is an animal. 
Ixy: x is a head of y. 
 
A formalization assigns a logical formula plus a realization to ordinary 
propositions. A realization interprets the categorematic parts of the formula, 
namely, its names, propositional variables and predicates. 
 
According to the standard formalization, De Morgan's argument is valid. 
However, this formalization is hardly ever argued for. The detailed reasons for it 
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are not obvious. In particular, the formalization of the conclusion is questioned. 
Presuming realization 1, Wengert(1974) suggests the following formalization: 
 
(C)': xy((Hy  Ixy)  (Jy  Ixy)) 
 
As will be seen, this alternative formalization raises the question of how 
extensively the formalization should take into account the relation of the 
concepts horse and animal. This is considered by Brun(2003). He discussed 
both of the mentioned alternatives and suggested a model of formalization 
according to which they are both correct. As soon as one acknowledges that 
questions of logical formalization imply conceptual analysis, it can also be 
questioned whether the formalization of the premise in terms of a formally 
invalid general implication is correct. At the end of this paper, an alternative 
formalization will be provided that formalizes the conclusion as well as the 
premise of De Morgan's argument in terms of a tautology. 
 
All of the different formalizations are based upon different formalization 
models. These models imply different aims, differences within semantics and 
different formalization criteria. These differences will be spelled out in the 
following sections. I will only consider first-order logic formalizations without 
identity. Furthermore, I will confine the discussion to criteria for the correct 
formalization of single propositions. Criteria of correct formalization may be 
defined either depending on relations of implication or depending on 
interpretations of first-order formulae. With respect to the former, one 
distinguishes between the correctness and completeness of a formalization, cf. 
Baumgartner/Lampert(2008), p. 103-111. I will abstain from addressing 
completeness as well as from defining correctness with respect to relations of 
implication. Instead, I will only consider criteria of correctness with respect to 
interpretations of first-order formulae. The criteria of correctness of the different 
models of formalization discussed here differ with respect to the understanding 
of what is meant by an interpretation of a logical formula. In addition to the 
criteria of correctness, the literature discusses criteria that refer to a certain 
structural similarity of the surface of the formalized proposition and its 
formalization. I will abstain from addressing these kinds of criteria as well. I 
will begin with Wengert's position, as it makes clear that the traditional 
formalization of De Morgan's argument requires justification. 
 
2. Interpretations as free verbalizations 
 
Who says “Heads of horses are heads of animals” does not merely mean V((C)) 
but V((C)'): 
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V((C)): “Every head of some horse is a head of some animal.” 
V((C)'): “Every horse that has a head is an animal that has that head.” 
 
In contrast to V((C)'), V((C)) is  still true even if some (or all) horses were not 
animals but the heads of those beings were still the heads of animals. This 
difference also exists between the formalizations (C) and (C)'. In contrast to 
(C)', there are models of (C) in which not all objects that satisfy H and are 
related to some object by I also satisfy J. V((C)) is a free verbalization of (C), 
and V((C)') is a free verbalization of (C)'. By use of the realizations, free 
verbalizations translate the logical formula into comprehensive ordinary 
propositions. From the fact that (C) is not equivalent to V((C)) but to V((C)'), 
Wengert drew the conclusion that (C) is correctly formalized by (C)' and not by 
(C).  He implicitly put forth the following criterion of correct formalization: 
 
criterion of verbalization (CRVERB): (A) is a correct formalization of a 
proposition A if and only if a free verbalization of (A), V((A)), and A are 
equivalent (have the same meaning). 
 
According to this criterion, an “interpretation of a formula” is understood as the 
free verbalization of the formula by use of the realization. By “equivalence”, it 
is not only meant that A and V((A)) have the same truth value. This condition is 
also satisfied in the case of (C) and V((C)). Instead, “equivalence” is meant in 
terms of “identity of meaning (content)”. This kind of equivalence clearly 
depends on both the concepts contained in A as well as on the realization. 
Wengert alludes to this by comparing (C) with proposition (R), which is similar 
with respect to its grammatical structure: 
 
 (R): Children of mothers are children of fathers. 
 
In this case, the following formalization is correct according to CRVERB: 
 
(R): x(y (Hy  Ixy)  y(Jy  Ixy)) 
 
Realization 2: 
Hx: x is a mother. 
Jx: x is a father. 
Ixy: x is a child of y. 
 
The free verbalization is as follows: 
 
V((R)): “Every child of some mother is a child of some father.” 
 5 
V((R)) has the same meaning as (R). In contrast, the replacement of (R) with 
(C)' (= (R)') results in an incorrect formalization, because in this case, 
V((R)') would result in “Every mother that has a child is a father that has that 
child”. Or, as Wengert(1974), p. 166 stated briefly, “Everybody's mother is his 
father”. Obviously this is not what is meant by (R). 
 
According to CRVERB, different logical formalizations of grammatically 
similar propositions might be correct. According to this point of view, one of the 
benefits of formalization is that it can express differences in logical form that are 
not expressed by the syntax of ordinary language. 
 
The following example is compatible with both formulae, (C) and (C)', in 
addition to the respective realization (cf. p. 20): 
 
(S): Bets on winning numbers are bets on prime numbers.  
 
(S) is ambiguous. CRVERB makes the two possible interpretations explicit: 
Either it means “Every bet on some winning number is also a bet on some prime 
number” or it means “Every bet on a winning number is a bet on a prime 
number”. The benefit of logical formalization according to CRVERB is found in 
expressing this difference in meaning through a syntactic difference in logical 
formulae. 
 
In fact, CRVERB is frequently used as a tool for judging formalizations. 
However, CRVERB faces the following problems: 
 
problem 1: No mechanical procedure exists to generate free verbalizations. One 
therefore runs the risk of generating a verbalization in light of the proposition to 
be formalized. In consequence, CRVERB cannot serve as an independent 
criterion. Even referring to an explicit paraphrase of the logical formula would 
not achieve a criterion. This is because it is generally not possible to judge the 
equivalence of a proposition to be formalized and an explicit paraphrase of a 
logical formula. In fact, the question “which of the alternative paraphrases is 
equivalent to A?” is as problematic as the question “which of the paraphrased 
alternative formalizations is correct?” 
 
problem 2: Judgments of equivalence or identity of meaning are presumed to be 
primitive. However, as will be seen with respect to alternative formalizations of 
De Morgan's argument, such judgments require further explication or 
justification. 
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As Brun(2003), p. 200 notes, one runs the risk of shifting the problem of 
identifying a correct formalization to the problem of identifying a correct free 
verbalization. As long as no algorithm is available to precisely define how to 
generate verbalizations, one cannot speak of a criterion in a strict sense. Rather, 
one might speak of a device that does not yield a definite decision in any case. 
 
However, CRVERB expresses a certain intuition: correct formalizations should 
not only correspond to the truth value of the proposition A to be formalized, but 
also to the meaning of A. According to this understanding, the logical formula 
represents the form of the meaning of A. The problem of CRVERB is how to 
explain the meaning of a proposition in this context. I will come back to this 
problem in sections 4 and 5. 
 
3. Interpretations as realizations 
 
The application of CRVERB to (C) of De Morgan's argument raises the question 
of how the traditional formalization of (C) by means of (C) can be justified. To 
argue that this formalization is based on the same criterion CRVERB but differs 
in understanding (C) in terms of V((C)) is not persuasive. Wengert drew the 
conclusion that the traditional formalization cannot be justified and must be 
given up in favor of (C)'. Brun likewise did not provide an argument in favor 
of (C) and against (C)'. In contrast to Wengert and Brun, this section shows 
how to reconstruct the traditional practice. I will distinguish between two 
different strategies of formalization that both justify the formalization of (C) by 
(C). The former is typical for philosophical traditions within logic, while the 
latter applies common strategies of formalization within mathematical logic. 
Although this strategy might not be as evident as others in the context of 
formalizing De Morgan's argument, I refer to it in order to illustrate different 
aims and criteria of logical formalization. 
 
3.1 Varying interpretations 
 
Within the philosophical tradition of logic textbooks, the aim of formalization is 
mostly to evaluate the formal validity of informal arguments. Examples of 
formalizations within this tradition go hand in hand with the distinction between 
form and content. Typically one refers to plain informally valid arguments, such 
as certain types of Aristotelian syllogisms, to motivate predicate logic as a 
necessary enhancement of propositional logic. Then, one notes that the validity 
of those arguments does not depend on the specific content of the concepts. This 
is done by replacing the predicates of the argument with other predicates with a 
different meaning. If one abstains from the specific predicates, one yields a 
schematization of the informal arguments. According to the standard view, the 
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logical form of the proposition corresponds to this schematization. The aim of 
formalization in this tradition is to abstain from the specific meaning of the 
predicates. This is incompatible with CRVERB, as this criterion refers to the 
specific meaning of the predicates within the realization in order to judge the 
identity of meaning of A and V((A)). According to the traditional view, a given 
realization is just one of many other possible interpretations of (A) that must be 
considered. In order to judge the correctness of a formalization, one must refer 
to varying interpretations / realizations. The realizations / interpretations 
regulate how to substitute propositional variables, predicates and names within 
the schematization of the proposition to be formalized. One thereby compares 
the schematization of A, sch(A), and (A) in accord with varying realizations / 
interpretations. In contrast to CRVERB, one refers to purely extensional 
judgments of equivalence: sch(A) and (A) must have the same truth value 
according to their respective interpretations. The interpretations of names, (t), 
of propositions, (A), and of predicates, (), are identified with their 
respective extensions: (t) is an object, (A) is a truth value, and () is a class 
of objects. 
 
Let us illustrate this approach by considering the formalization of (C). Like (R) 
and (S), (C) is an instance of sch(C): 
 
sch(C): All Xs of Ys are Xs of Zs. 
 
Strictly speaking, schematizations may presume changes in structure and 
wording of the respective propositions, cf. p. 11 below. Furthermore, we must 
presume a correlation of the schemas X,Y,Z and the terms of the realization. 
Thus, in our example, the interpretation of X and Ixy, of Y and Hx and of Z and 
Jx are correlated. Considering the correctness of (C)' for (C), it does not suffice 
to evaluate whether sch(C) and (C)' have the same truth value according to 
realization 1. In fact, one may admit that (C) is to be understood in terms of 
V((C)'). However, judging the correctness of (C)' also requires considering 
whether sch(C) and (C)' have the same truth value according to realization 2. 
This is not the case; (R) is true while realization 2 is not a model of (C)'. For 
this reason, (C)' is not a correct formalization of (C). In contrast, the truth value 
of sch(C) corresponds to the truth value of (C) relative to both realizations. 
Whereas (C) represents the form of (C), (C)' does not represent the form of 
(C); (C)' does not correspond to sch(C). One erroneously considers semantic 
aspects if one chooses (C)'. However, this model of formalization requires that 
logical formalization must be independent of the specific meaning of the 
categorematic parts of propositions. 
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The traditional formalization of De Morgan's argument is based on the following 
criterion: 
 
varying- criterion (VCR): (A) is a correct formalization of a proposition A if 
and only if the schematization of A, sch(A), and (A) have the same truth value 
relative to all interpretations / realizations. 
 
In contrast to CRVERB, the intention of this criterion is to evaluate the 
correctness of formalizations merely with respect to formal equivalence. Any 
implication based on conceptual relations must not be considered. De Morgan's 
argument can still be proven as (formally) valid according to this approach. 
However, the class of arguments that are proven as valid according to this 
strategy is significantly smaller than it is according to formalization strategies 
not based on schematization. The following example illustrates this: 
 
argument B: Heads of horses are heads of animals. The horse Fury has a head. 
Therefore: Fury is an animal. 
 
According to a pre-theoretic, informal understanding of validity, argument B is 
valid. This means that the truth of the premises is incompatible with the 
falsehood of the conclusion. How to explicate this validity is another question. 
The traditional strategy of formalization in compliance with VCR does not 
make it possible to explicate argument B as a valid argument in terms of first-
order logic. The reason for this is that its schematization allows for invalid 
instances such as the following: 
 
argument C: Children of mothers are children of fathers. The mother Jane has a 
child. Therefore: Jane is a father. 
 
In contrast, CRVERB allows one to prove the validity of argument B by means 
of first-order logic without thus implying that argument C is valid. This shows 
that VCR goes hand in hand with a loss of the power to explicate the validity 
of arguments by means of first-order logic. 
 
Other examples that are praised as achievements of the logical analysis of 
ordinary language show that VCR trivializes the problem of formalizing 
ordinary propositions. Consider, for example, Davidson's analysis of action 
sentences: 
 
argument D: Ann strolls slowly. Therefore: Ann strolls. 
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Davidson's strategy makes it possible to formalize this argument as valid 
according to first-order logic: 
 
(D): x (Fx  Gx  Ixa) |- x (Fx  Ixa) 
 
Realization 3: 
Fx: x is a stroll. 
Gx: x is slowly. 
Ixy: x is conducted by y. 
a: Ann. 
 
However, this formalization is not correct according to VCR. This can be seen 
by replacing “slowly” with “allegedly”. 
 
There are two strategies for avoiding this objectionable consequence of 
trivializing formalization: (i) the limitation of admissible interpretations and (ii) 
standardization. Strategy (i), for example, is applied if one rules out the 
substitution of “slowly” by “allegedly” in argument D. The same strategy is 
applied in the following case: 
 
argument E: John loves a human. Therefore: Some human exists. 
argument F: John seeks a unicorn. Therefore: Some unicorn exists. 
 
Argument E is valid, whereas argument F is not. The validity of argument E can 
be proven by the following formalization: 
 
(E): x (Fx  Gax) |- x Fx 
 
Realization 4: 
Fx: x is a human. 
Gxy: x loves y. 
a: John. 
 
According to CRVERB, this is a correct formalization of argument E. However, 
(E) with a respective realization is not a correct formalization of argument F, 
because “John seeks a unicorn” and “Some unicorn exists that John seeks” are 
not identical in meaning. In contrast to the latter, the former does not imply the 
existence of some unicorn. 
 
According to VCR, however, one cannot make this argument. The replacement 
of “love” with “seek” and “human” with “unicorn” results in an invalid 
argument. Thus, (E) cannot be a correct formalization according to VCR 
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unless one rules out this alternative interpretation. Indeed, this interpretation is 
commonly excluded by arguing that “to seek” is not a predicate obeying the 
principle of extensionality. This is demonstrated by the fact that “x seeks y” 
might be true even in case that no y exists to be sought. Yet, this raises the 
problem of how to define a criterion for distinguishing between admissible and 
inadmissible interpretations. This question also becomes relevant with respect to 
the possibility of formalizing paradoxes. Is “x is a member of x”, for example, 
an admissible predicate as one assumes by formalizing Russell's Paradox within 
predicate logic? The question is whether the two commonly presumed semantic 
principles, namely, the principle of extensionality and the principle of bivalence, 
suffice to rule out inadmissible interpretations. I will return to this question in 
section 6. 
 
In addition to strategy (i), strategy (ii), namely standardization, is indispensable 
for applying VCR. Standardization indicates the rephrasing of ordinary 
propositions to the effect that their surface grammar becomes more similar to 
logical formulae. For example, one may rephrase argument D as follows: “Some 
event x exists such that x is a stroll and x is slowly and x is conducted by Ann. 
Therefore: Some event x exists such that x is a stroll and x is conducted by 
Ann.” However, the question of a correct formalization is clearly shifted to the 
question of correct standardization. It is also apparent that standardization is 
necessary if one refers to schematization. Consider, for example, (C), (R) and 
(S): rephrases are necessary to schematize all of these by “All Xs of Ys are Xs 
of Zs”. 
 
If one dispensed with strategy (ii), only arguments that are explicit paraphrases 
of formally valid inferences could be proven as logically valid. As a 
consequence, formalization would become an unprofitable endeavor. Nearly all 
pre-theoretically valid arguments had to be classified as “semantically valid”. 
This is not in fact what is done. In sum, if one applies VCR, strategies (i) and / 
or (ii) are almost always used. However, if this is conceded, one can hardly 
sustain the distinction of formally and semantically valid arguments. Instead, 
one should regard reducing the validity of arguments, if possible, to formally 
valid formalizations as a first task of logical formalization. 
 
The problems of VCR result from the reference to schematizations, which are 
indispensable if one intends to pass judgment upon the correctness of 
formalizations due to varying interpretations. Like CRVERB, all of the 
following models of formalization do not depend on schematizations and do not 
vary realizations. 
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3.2 Fixed interpretations 
 
As in the philosophical tradition of logic, mathematical logic refers to 
realizations in terms of interpretations and presumes a purely extensional 
conception of interpretations. However, in contrast to the philosophical tradition, 
it is referred to a logical language that assigns a fixed interpretation not only to 
so-called “logical constants” but to all constituents of the formal language. The 
question of formalization thus becomes a question of translation (or encoding). 
 
The objective of this model of formalization is to prove the truth of propositions 
by their derivation from axioms (or the falsity of propositions by deriving their 
negation from axioms). This objective would be satisfied if any true proposition 
is formalized by P  P (and any false one by P P). However, the problem is 
that this would presume knowledge of the truth values. This is exactly what one 
wants to find by deriving the proposition or its negation within an axiomatic 
system. To do so, one must translate the proposition into a proposition of the 
presumed logical language. A logical language L is understood as a pair 
consisting of the recursively defined formulae, L, and the fixed interpretation, , 
of all expressions of the alphabet of L. Formalization consists in translating 
ordinary propositions into propositions of a presumed logical language with a 
limited vocabulary. Thus, the objective is to prove the truth or falsehood of as 
many propositions that can be expressed by L as possible. These proofs are 
carried out within an axiomatic theory T that comprises only a limited number 
of non-logical axioms. Gödel has shown that this ideal cannot be realized to its 
full extent for basic arithmetic if basic arithmetic is formalized according to this 
model of logical formalization. In order to address this conception of 
formalization, predicates of ordinary language must first be expressed by 
predicates of L. This is done according to the following criterion: 
 
express-criterion (ECR): A predicate Px of ordinary language is expressed by 
(x) of L if and only if for all x 
– if an object satisfies Px, then (x) is true, 
– if an object does not satisfy Px, then (x) is true. 
 
The application of ECR does not presume that the truth value of Px is known for 
every object. Rather, it is presumed that one can judge whether Px and (x) have  
the same extension according to . 
 
In the case of formalizing De Morgan's argument along these lines, one must 
presume a logical language with the predicates Hx, Jx and Ixy and their fixed 
interpretations in terms of realization 1. Thus, (H) is the extension of “_ is a 
horse”, (J) is the extension of  “_ is an animal”, and (I) is the extension of “_ 
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is a head of _”. According to ECR and L, the predicates “x is a head of a horse” 
and “x is a head of an animal”, which occur in (C), are to be translated as 
follows: 
x is a head of a horse =Def y (Hy  Ixy) 
x is a head of an animal =Def y (Jy  Ixy) 
 
In contrast, y(Hy  Ixy) or y(Jy  Ixy) would not satisfy ECR. 
 
To translate (C) into an expression in L, (C) must be rephrased as a proposition 
that can be effectively translated to L. (C) is of the form “Ys are Zs”. 
Propositions of this form are translated to general implications of the form “For 
all x, if x is Y, then x is Z”. This results in the following rephrase of (C), (C*) 
“For all x, if x is a head of a horse, then x is a head of an animal”. To translate 
(C*) to L, the definitions of “x is a head of a horse” and “x is a head of an 
animal” must be applied. This results in (C): x (y (Hy  Ixy)  y (Jy  
Ixy)). This is an effective translation of (C**) “For all x, if some y exists such 
that y is a horse and x is a head of y, then some y exists such that y is an animal 
and x is a head of y”. (C**) is obtained from (C) by expressing (C) by means of 
the vocabulary of L. The formalization of (C) by (C) is based on the following 
criterion: 
 
fixed- criterion (FCR): (A) of a logical language L with a fixed 
interpretation ,  <L, >,   is a correct formalization of a proposition A if and 
only if (A) is an effective translation of A or of a rephrasing of A in respect to 
<L, >. 
 
(C) (or (C)) is to be proven by derivation from axioms. For this sake, it 
suffices to introduce x(Hx  Jx) as a non-logical axiom. This axiom expresses 
the relation of (H) and (J). The class of horses is a subclass of the class of 
animals. As a consequence, (C) is true as (C) is derivable from the axiom x 
(Hx Jx). Thus, the following criterion is satisfied: 
 
capture-criterion (CCR): A proposition A is captured by an axiomatic theory T if 
and only if 
– if A is true, then T |- (A), 
– if A is false, then T |- (A). 
 
Thus, the aim of this model is satisfied in the case of De Morgan's argument as 
(C) follows from T, namely, x (Hx Jx). 
 
This model of formalization does not intend to represent the meaning of a 
proposition or its truth conditions. This can be seen by the fact that ECR is still 
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satisfied if arbitrary formulae that are true according to the fixed interpretation 
are added by conjunction. “x is the head of an animal”, for example, could also 
be expressed by y(Jy  Ixy)  yz(Hz  Iyz). The same holds in the case of 
CCR and theorems of T that are added by conjunction. ECR and CCR are purely 
based on extensional considerations, cf. Smith(2007), p. 33-36. 
 
In contrast to philosophically motivated models of formalization, the use of 
formalization within mathematical logic is not motivated by logical analysis of 
ordinary language or by proofs of the formal validity of informal arguments. 
Proofs of validity are only considered within the framework of an axiomatic 
theory T. If some informally valid argument cannot be proven as formally valid, 
this is not a deficiency of the formalization but rather of T. For example, the 
conclusion of argument B, cf. p. 9, follows trivially from the second premise and 
the axiom that all horses are animals. This can be shown by the fact that the 
formalization of the second premise implies Ha (= “Fury is a horse”). From this 
and the formalization of the axiom, x(Hx Jx), the formula Ja (= “Fury is an 
animal”) follows. Within the framework of T, the problem does not arise that the 
conclusion is not derivable. As it is not referred to schematization, the problem 
of distinguishing between formally and semantically valid arguments does not 
arise either. 
 
As a matter of fact, philosophical requirements of a theory of formalization are 
not fulfilled by this mathematical model of formalization. One reason for this is 
that the problem of formalization is trivialized due to the presumption of an 
effective translation of the propositions in questions or of their rephrasing. 
Controversial formalizations of propositions that cannot be effectively translated 
into a logical language cannot be resolved by referring to FCR. For example, 
one cannot argue with respect to FCR why “Smith died because he ate tomato 
sorbet” is not correctly formalized by P  Q with “(P) = Smith died” and 
“(Q) = Smith ate tomato sorbet”. However, this model of formalization does 
not claim to fulfill such aims of other models of formalization. Only 
propositions that can be expressed within the vocabulary of L and that can be 
translated effectively to L are considered. By making use of logical 
formalization within mathematics, the only propositions that are considered are 
more or less standardized and are capable of being effectively translated to a 
logical language with a suitable vocabulary. A problem of formalization in 
which one has to identify the correct logical form of the propositions in the first 
place is not recognized within the framework of this model. 
 
However, as I will explain in section 6, this also marks the problem of this 
model of formalization, even in applying it to mathematical propositions. The 
grammatical form of declarative sentences is seen as sufficient reason for their 
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capability of being true or false and thus of their capability of being logically 
formalized. Whatever can be effectively translated to a logical language seems 
to be logically correct. Logical formalization is not a means of identifying 
fallacies that stem from taking the apparent form of ordinary propositions as 
their real, logical form. As we will see, it cannot be excluded on this basis that 
paradoxes relying on meaningless, inadmissible interpretations are expressed by 
apparently meaningful logical formulae. This problem is shared by FCR and 
VCR. Neither one provides a sufficient criterion for distinguishing admissible 
and inadmissible interpretations. As a consequence, they cannot distinguish 
between proofs by reduction, which prove the incompatibility or falsehood of 
axioms under the presumption of a correct formalization, and paradoxes, which 
rely on incorrect logical formalizations of meaningless propositions. We will 
come back to this in section 6. 
 
4. Interpretations as restricted truth conditions 
 
The following two models of formalization to be discussed in this and the 
following section adhere to the philosophical tradition of formalizing ordinary 
propositions independent of a logical language with a fixed interpretation and 
independent of axioms of a theory T. As opposed to the philosophical tradition 
of logic textbooks, the aim of these two models is not restricted to the proof of 
the validity of informal arguments. Instead, they are concerned with the logical 
analysis of ordinary language. They share the intuition underlying CRVERB: 
logical formalization serves to logically analyze the meaning of ordinary 
propositions. However, this is made precise within a framework of semantics 
that understands interpretations of a logical formula as an expression of truth 
conditions of meaningful propositions. In this respect, they differ from the 
semantics underlying the models described in the previous section. Both of the 
following models presume that formal and semantic validity cannot be 
reasonably distinguished. As a consequence, they account for the internal 
relation between the concepts horse and animal by formalizing De Morgan's 
argument. 
 
In contrast to Wengert and the tradition of logical textbooks, Blau and Brun 
articulated criteria of formalization. Their criterion of correctness is as follows, 
cf. Brun(2004), p. 208: 
 
TC: (A) is a correct formalization of proposition A if and only if (A) and A 
have the same truth values with respect to all interpretations in terms of 
conditions of truth or falsehood of A that are suitable according to the 
realization. 
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TC differs from VCR in essentially two respects: (i) it refers to interpretations 
in terms of conditions of truth and falsehood, and (ii) it understands the truth 
conditions / interpretations as a function of the realization, cf. Brun(2003), p. 
209-211. While VCR considers the truth value of different propositions, TC 
refers to truth values of the same proposition with respect to different conditions. 
This determines a conception of interpretations that deviates significantly from 
that presumed in VCR or FCR. Interpretations articulate truth conditions of 
formulae and propositions. They represent possible extensions of categorematic 
parts, namely, possible extensions of predicates, possible truth values of atomic 
propositions and possible references of names. In contrast, VCR and FCR 
presume that any interpretation refers to the actual extension of a predicate, 
atomic proposition or name. For example, if one interprets P by “Paris is the 
capital of France”, then (P) = T according to traditional semantics, as Paris is 
indeed the capital of France. According to TC, however, (P)=T and (P)=F  
are two possible truth values of the atomic proposition “Paris is the capital of 
France”. Thus, according to this semantics, the interpretations vary in terms of 
possible extensions of predicates, atomic propositions and names, while the 
predicates, atomic propositions and names are assigned to fixed expressions by 
the realization. According to this understanding, the question in each case is how 
the truth value of the proposition to be formalized and the truth value of the 
formula depend on the respective possible extensions of the categorematic 
constituents. 
 
According to Blau's and Brun's model of formalization, it may happen that 
certain extensions of the categorematic parts are unsuitable interpretations, as 
they constitute unsuitable conditions of truth or falsehood due to their meaning. 
For example, the realizations of the formalizations (C) and (C)' both refer to 
the concepts horse and animal. Due to the meaning of these two concepts, 
interpretations in which the class of horses is not a subclass of the class of 
animals are unsuitable. This takes into account the conceptual, internal relation 
of horses and animals according to which it is impossible that some horse is not 
an animal. This is no possible condition that allows one to judge the truth or 
falsehood of (C). Interpretations in terms of varying possible extensions of fixed 
concepts (propositions, names) only determine consistent conditions of truth or 
falsehood if “unsuitable interpretations” are not taken into account. That is why 
TC refers to suitable interpretations as a function of the realizations. From this, it 
follows that, in the case of formalizing (C), the logical difference between (C) 
and (C)' is of no consequence: the interpretations that are models of (C) but 
not models of (C)' are unsuitable. For this reason, Brun qualifies both (C)' and 
(C) as correct formalizations of (C). Both (C) and (C)' have the same truth 
value that (C) has with respect to all suitable interpretations. 
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Compared to CRVERB, this conception has the advantage that it explicates the 
equivalence or identity of meaning of the formalization and of the proposition in 
question in terms of identity of truth conditions. Regarding VCR, TC does not 
refer to the problematic schematization of ordinary propositions. However, the 
formalization of (C) reveals a fundamental problem of this conception. Non-
equivalent formulae, such as (C) and (C)', are equivalent with respect to the 
restricted space of possible interpretations. This shows that this conception is 
incompatible with the traditional semantics of first-order formulae. Thus, 
formulae become tautologies that are no tautologies according to common 
standards of first-order logic. Finally, not only the interpretations but also the 
truth conditions and logical relations of first-order formulae become a function 
of the realizations and, thus, of the proposition to be formalized. In fact, one 
does not explicate the truth conditions and logical relations of ordinary 
propositions by means of formalizations within first-order logic. This problem is 
labeled “the problem of suitable interpretation”', cf. 
Baumgartner/Lampert(2008). 
 
Another problematic consequence of the impossibility of identifying only one 
correct formula out of multiple non-equivalent formulae is the impossibility of 
deciding upon the validity of arguments in certain cases. For example, this 
problem arises in the case of formalizing argument B, cf. p. 9. The formalization 
of (C) by (C) results in an invalid formalization (according to standard first-
order logic), while the formalization of (C) with (C)' results in a valid 
formalization. A “problem of validity” arises from this and further assumptions 
of this model of formalization, namely, the problem of identifying the validity of 
certain valid arguments, cf. Lampert/Baumgartner(2010). This problem 
complements the so-called “problem of invalidity” identified by Massey(1975). 
This problem results from the fact that formally invalid formalizations may be 
correct for valid arguments, while no criterion is available to constrain the class 
of potentially correct formalizations to be finite. Thus, it is impossible to 
conclude the invalidity of the formalized argument from a correct and invalid 
formalization. In the following section, I propose a modification of TC that 
solves all of the aforementioned problems. 
 
5. Interpretations as unrestricted truth conditions 
 
The “problem of suitable interpretations” arises from the fact that the space of 
possible interpretations is restricted by logical dependencies that are due to the 
realization's concepts. This problem does not arise if one claims that the 
concepts of a realization must be logically independent. This means that the 
space of possible interpretations is unrestricted. I call realizations satisfying this 
condition “suitable realizations”. The semantics based on interpretations in 
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terms of conditions of truth or falsehood must rely on their logical 
independence. Traditional semantics are based on the principles of bivalence 
and extensionality. The principle of bivalence states that any proposition is 
either true or false. The principle of extensionality states that the truth or 
falsehood of any proposition depends on nothing but the extension of the 
categorematic parts. Within semantics referring to truth conditions, these two 
principles must be complemented by the principle of logical independence.  This 
principle claims that all interpretations that may be generated by combinatorial 
means are also possible. Thus, if n propositional variables occur in the 
realization, 2
n
 interpretations are admissible. If u predicates with arity k1 … ku 
occur in the realization, 2
ik1
+ … + i
ku
 interpretations must be possible with 
respect to a domain with i objects.2 Any name can be interpreted by any of these 
i objects. According to this understanding, the principle of independence implies 
the principle of bipolarity, which states that any atomic proposition may be 
either true or false. The principle of independence is indispensable for any 
theory of formalization based upon both: (i) semantics of truth conditions and 
(ii) standard first-order logic (without identity). Any formula that is a tautology 
according to the standard extensional semantics is also a tautology according to 
this semantics and v.v. Within this conception, the suitable realizations assign 
meaningful expressions to the categorematic parts of the formulae. These 
assignments are fixed, while their interpretations in terms of their possible 
extensions vary without any restrictions. Only truth conditional semantics 
relying on the principle of independence make a logical analysis of ordinary 
language possible, which reduces and explicates informal logical dependencies 
within ordinary language to formal logical dependencies of first-order formulae. 
To satisfy this claim, no internal, logical dependencies must exist between the 
categorematic parts of the realizations. 
 
The criterion of correctness established by this model results from modifying 
TC: 
 
TC': (A) is a correct formalization of a proposition A if and only if (A) and A 
have the same truth values with respect to suitable realizations that do not 
restrict the space of possible interpretations in terms of conditions of truth and 
falsehood of A. 
 
                                           
2
 In fact, we confine domains to enumerable numbers of objects, which also suffices 
according to the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem of traditional semantics. Referring to “non-
denumerable” domains makes no sense according to a truth-conditional semantics. 
However, the important point is that no limitations due to the concepts of the realization 
are called for. Possible interpretations are solely defined by combinatorial means within 
the realm of enumerability.  
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Let us illustrate the application of this criterion by formalizing De Morgan's 
argument. Like Brun, it is assumed that the concept horse contains the concept 
animal. In contrast to all other models of formalization, TC' thus rules out 
realizations that contain both of these two concepts. Rather, TC' reduces this 
conceptual implication to a formal one. For the following, it is assumed that 
horses are defined as animals with a certain differentia specifica, say “tiptoeing 
equid”'. We also presume that it is possible to be a tiptoeing equid but not an 
animal. This may, in fact, be false, but it shall not be excluded by the meaning of 
the concepts. According to these assumptions, the following formalization of De 
Morgan's argument is correct according to TC': 
 
(P): Horses are animals. 
(P)TC': x((Gx  Jx)  Jx). 
 
(C): Heads of horses are heads of animals. 
(C)TC': x((Gx  Jx  Ix)  (Jx  Ix)) 
 
Suitable realization: 
Gx: x is a tiptoeing equid. 
Jx: x is an animal. 
Ix: x has a head. 
 
It would also be possible to replace Ix with the dyadic predicate Iyx, 
representing “y is a head of x”. Regardless of whether y would be bound by an 
existential quantifier or a universal quantifier, the resulting formula would be a 
tautology. However, in contrast to all of the other proposals for formalizing De 
Morgan's argument, it is not necessary to introduce a dyadic predicate to derive 
(C). According to TC', both the premise and the conclusion of De Morgan's 
argument are tautologies if one presumes that horses are defined as animals. 
This seems unexpected, as De Morgan's argument suggests that (C) follows 
from (P) and not from any premise. However, the presumed conceptual relation 
between the concepts horse and animal is already contained in the conclusion. 
This is taken into account by (C)TC' by virtue of representing the concept horse 
by Gx  Jx and the concept animal by Jx. According to this understanding, it is 
still adequate to say that heads of horses are heads of animals because horses are 
animals. However, this justification is not expressed by a formally valid 
inference from a premise that is assumed to be true. Instead, this internal relation 
is expressed within the formalization of (C). Thus, (P) is not a falsifiable 
proposition on which the truth of the conclusion depends. Instead, (P) articulates 
a conceptual relation that must be taken into account if the truth conditions of 
(C) are to be correctly represented. It is the correct formal representation of (C) 
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takes into account the internal relation of the concepts horse and animal and this 
demonstrates (C)’s validity. 
 
In contrast, the similar propositions (R), cf. p. 5, and (S), cf. p. 6, are not to be 
formalized by tautologies. A TC'-correct formalization of (R) is the following: 
 
(R): Children of mothers are children of fathers. 
(R)TC': x(y (Hy  Ixy)  y(Hy  Ixy)) 
 
Suitable realization: 
Hx: x is a woman. 
Ixy: x is a child of y. 
 
This formalization presumes that no object exists that (i) is neither a woman nor 
a man and (ii) is a woman and a man. This is plausible on the basis of human 
beings as domains. Thus, men are definable by “x is not a woman”. 
 
(S): Bets on winning numbers are bets on prime numbers. 
(S)TC': xy((Hy  Ixy)  (Jy  Ixy)) 
 
Suitable realization:  
Hx: x is a winning number. 
Jx: x is a prime number. 
Ixy: x is a bet on y. 
 
This formalization expresses that (S) means that any bet on a winning number is 
also a bet on a prime number. In this sense, the concepts winning numbers and 
prime numbers are logically independent, but as a matter of fact all winning 
numbers are prime numbers. On the other hand, if (S) means that whoever bets 
on a winning number also bets on a prime number, the following formalization 
with the respective realization would be TC'-correct: 
 
(S)TC': x(y (Hy  Ixy)  y(Jy  Ixy)) 
 
Thus, one should illustrate the limits of monadic first-order logic by referring to 
an argument based on (S) rather than referring to De Morgan's argument. 
 
The key point is that the respective formalization is understood as an explication 
of the truth conditions of the proposition to be formalized. It is by no means 
presumed that the formalization of an ordinary proposition must be 
unambiguous. Rather, logical formalization presents a means for unambiguously 
expressing the respective meaning. It is also not assumed that the mentioned  
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TC'-correct formalization of De Morgan's argument is the only possible correct 
explication of (P) and (C). Rather, the formalization depends on the assumed 
relation of the concepts horse and animal. If one does not assume that these two 
concepts are logically dependent, TC' claims a different formalization. If it is 
assumed that it is not meaningless that horses exist that are not animals, the 
common formalizations might well be TC'-correct. With this assumption, 
Wengert's formalization, (C)', is TC'-correct if it means that any horse with a 
head is an animal with that respective head. The traditional formalization, (C), 
is correct if it simply means that whenever something is the head of a horse it is 
also the head of an animal. Of course, the stronger claim follows from the 
assumption that all horses are animals. However, this does not mean that this 
stronger claim is inferred. 
 
The purpose of logical formalization according to this model is to explicate the 
truth conditions of ordinary propositions. This model explains precisely what is 
meant by a formal representation of the meaning of propositions; namely, the 
representation of their truth conditions by a logical formula according to suitable 
realizations. It is important to note that the space of possible interpretations is 
defined independent of and prior to the categorematic parts of suitable 
interpretations. The form of propositions representable by first-order logic is 
thus not defined by ordinary language; one needs to refer neither to the 
grammatical surface nor to some assumed deep structure of ordinary 
propositions. Instead, the form of propositions is provided by first-order logic, 
namely, by its ability to represent truth conditions. Logical formalizations 
determine whether some ordinary proposition has the form of a proposition with 
precisely defined truth conditions according to logic. 
 
The vagueness of ordinary language is no objection against the conception of 
logical formalization in terms of the logical analysis of ordinary language. 
Rather, this vagueness motivates the task of logical formalization. It is also not 
presumed that ordinary propositions must have definite truth conditions with 
respect to context and speaker. The purpose of logical formalization is to 
express possible meanings of ordinary propositions. This is compatible with the 
fact that no purported formalization expresses what is meant by some 
proposition. In this case, what is not meant by the proposition is at least 
clarified. This leaves the question open as to whether it is at all possible to 
express the meaning of a proposition within first-order logic. In any case, logical 
formalization fulfils the purpose of explicating the meaning of propositions by 
providing the means to precisely explain their truth conditions. 
 
TC' overcomes the problems of the other models of formalization. In contrast to 
TC, the problems of validity and invalidity are solved in addition to the   
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problem of suitable interpretations. This is because by claiming identical truth 
conditions with respect to suitable realizations, valid arguments are formalized 
correctly if and only if their formalization is formally valid. The problems of 
VCR result from the reference to schematization. The semantics according to 
which interpretations represent conditions of the truth and falsehood of 
propositions make this reference superfluous. In contrast to VCR, TC' reduces 
informal logical dependencies of ordinary concepts and propositions to formal 
relations within logic. Furthermore, in contrast to VCR and FCR, TC' is not 
in need of a criterion for admissible interpretations. Any interpretation that is 
possible according to combinatorial means is also admissible, and it represents a 
condition that allows one to judge the truth value of a proposition. If this claim 
is not satisfied, then the claim of suitable realizations is also not satisfied. As a 
consequence, the formalization is not TC'-correct. If some proposition does not 
have truth conditions that can be represented within logic according to TC', it is 
meaningless according to logic. The crucial advantage of the truth conditional 
semantics, as compared to the semantics that VCR and FCR rely on, is that 
they do not refer to actual extensions, but more basically to possible extensions. 
Thus, it is possible to use logical formalization as a means of determining the 
meaning of propositions rather than simply assuming it. Furthermore, 
standardizations are not assumed but instead result from paraphrases of TC'-
correct formalizations. In contrast to CRVERB, judgments of equivalence are 
not assumed to be primitive. Rather, they are based upon explications of truth 
conditions, which, in turn, refer to the construction of possible interpretations. It 
is even possible to refer to an effective, mechanical procedure to generate 
verbalizations in terms of explications of truth conditions. At least this is 
possible in so far as it is possible to not only enumerate single models 
(conditions of truth) and counter-models (conditions of falsehood), but also to 
identify the class of models and counter-models by certain distributive normal 
forms, cf. Lampert(2006). 
 
The presumed semantics of TC' as well as the objective of explaining the truth 
conditions of ordinary propositions are rooted in the philosophical tradition of 
logical analysis of ordinary language. The most decisive articulation of this 
conception can be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The main reason that this 
model of formalization is rarely articulated and is not applied to all 
consequences lies in the strong claim of suitable realizations. The principle of 
logical independence seems to be unsatisfiable with respect to logical 
dependencies of ordinary language expressions. Thus, like VCR,  TC' runs the 
risk of unduly restricting the realm of informal arguments that can be formalized 
within first-order language. For example, should one decline to formalize “All 
men are beings. All beings are mortal. Therefore, all men are mortal” by means 
of a syllogismus barbara merely because the respective realization is not 
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suitable? Or should one question the formalization of an inference by means of a 
modus ponens simply because, by adding an arbitrary premise, the principle of 
logical independence is no longer satisfied? Finally, does TC' not rely on the 
unrealistic presumption that propositions of ordinary language can be analyzed 
as a truth function of logically independent, bipolar atomic propositions? 
 
Wittgenstein dealt with questions like these in his Notebooks from 1914-16. 
How can logic be applied to ordinary language, he asked, if one cannot carry out 
the complete analysis of ordinary propositions, cf., for example, 
Wittgenstein(1995), diary entries from 3.9.-7.9.1914, 11.10.1914, 20.6.-
22.6.1915? On the one hand, Wittgenstein assumed in the Tractatus that the real, 
logical form of ordinary propositions can only be revealed by analyzing them in 
a truth function of logically independent, bipolar atomic propositions, cf. 
Wittgenstein(1995), remark 5. On the other hand, he assumed that logic can be 
applied to unanalyzed propositions in so far as their categorematic parts can be 
treated as if they were primitive and logically independent, cf., for example,  
Wittgenstein(1995), entries form 11.10.1914[2], 21.6.1915[10]. The mentioned 
disagreeable consequences can be avoided if the demand of reducing informal 
logical dependencies to formal logical relations is met in a pragmatic and 
context-dependent way. From the possibility of identifying further informal 
logical dependencies by formal ones, it does not follow that one must do so. One 
may well treat expressions of the realization as if they were primitive and 
logically independent, even if they might be capable of some further analysis. 
The application of TC' achieves neither more nor less than making explicit the 
internal relations that follow from this assumption. Any further detailed analysis 
can only reveal more internal relations and thus invoke a more thorough 
understanding of the meaning of the proposition to be formalized. However, no 
further detailed analysis can revise identified internal relations that are already 
identified by a superficial analysis. For example, one can accept the traditional 
formalizations of De Morgan's argument, (C) or (C)', as an expression of the 
internal relation between the premise (P) and the conclusion (C) that results even 
if one does not consider the relations between the concepts horse and animal as 
internal. A more thorough analysis considers this relation within the 
formalization of the conclusion (C). This results in (C)TC', which does not 
derive the conclusion of the argument from some external relation of the class of 
horses and the class of animals, but rather from the internal relation of the 
concepts horse and animal. This does not reject the justification of (C) by (P) 
but makes explicit that this conceptual relation is already implied by (C) itself.  
 
According to this model, the benefit of logical formalization consists in making 
explicit the truth conditions of ordinary propositions. How far one abstains from 
implied logical dependencies depends on the context and the aim of the 
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respective formalization. Finally, by means of Russell's Paradox, we will 
illustrate the importance of relativizing inferences from formalizations to 
presumed criteria of formalization and to the grade of analysis.  
 
6. Inadmissible interpretations 
 
Within mathematical logic, Russell's Paradox is mostly understood as a 
refutation of the unrestricted comprehension axiom schema. Expressed within 
ordinary language, this axiom of “naïve” set theory is as follows: 
 
UCAS: There exists a set y whose members are precisely those objects that 
satisfy the propositional function (x). 
 
According to FCR and a logical language with the dyadic predicate x   y and 
its fixed interpretation as “x is a member  of y”, UCAS is to be formalized as 
follows: 
 
(UCAS): yx(x  y  (x)) 
 
The replacement of (x) with “x is not a member of itself” and x  x, 
respectively, results in Russell's Paradox: 
 
UCAS*: There exists a set y whose members are precisely those objects that 
satisfy the propositional function x is not a member of itself. 
(UCAS*):  yx(x  y  x  x) 
 
From (UCAS*), a contradiction follows. In the framework of modern set 
theory, this is taken as a sufficient reason to conclude that UCAS is false. 
Russell's Paradox apparently demonstrates that there are concepts that do not 
define sets. According to FCR, this reasoning is conclusive. According to 
modern mathematical logic, Russell’s Paradox refutes naïve set theory and calls 
for a different axiomatic system such as ZF that does not allow for Russell’s 
Paradox due to the axiom of separation. Likewise, according to VCR, 
(UCAS*) is correct, and thus, UCAS* is contradictory. 
 
Russell himself argued this way in Principles of Mathematics, Russell(1992), p. 
102f. However, (UCAS*) is incompatible with the view that Russell and 
Whitehead advanced in Principia Mathematica, cf. Whitehead(1910), p. 75. 
Here, they analyzed  as an incomplete symbol. This analysis is incompatible 
with the understanding of  as a primitive symbol in terms of a dyadic 
predicate. According to the point of view put forth in the Principia, not all 
interpretations of x  y are admissible. 
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Within the framework of a theory of formalization, such a critique is opened up 
by TC'.  does not satisfy this criterion as its interpretation is not unrestricted. 
At least some interpretations do not lead to meaningful, bipolar propositions. 
Thus, correctly understood, Russell's Paradox is not a reduction to absurdity of 
the unrestricted comprehension axiom schema. Instead, the fault of the paradox 
lies in the formalization of “x is a member of y” in terms of a dyadic, logical 
predicate that articulates a primitive relation between objects. x  y is not a 
proper propositional function identifying sets. According to this point of view, 
the solution of the paradox consists in an alternative formalization of 
propositions about sets, for example propositions such as UCAS. However, it is 
not necessary to abandon UCAS. The paradox, in terms of a reduction to 
absurdity of an assumption that seemed to be true, is due to a mistaken 
formalization. 
 
Only by TC' can one distinguish between two kinds of “absurdity”: (i) the 
absurdity relying on a proof by reduction and (ii) the absurdity relying on an 
inadequate logical formalization. Without TC', there is no sufficient criterion for 
distinguishing between meaningful but inconsistent propositions and 
meaningless propositions that cannot be formalized within logic. In the first 
case, we have a contradiction within the axiomatic system, while in the second 
case, we have a contradiction to logic. Put more precisely, we have a 
contradiction to the principles of a logic that provides the means for representing 
propositions with well-defined conditions of truth and falsehood. In this case, 
the propositions to be formalized cannot be true because well-defined 
interpretations in terms of meaningful conditions of truth and falsehood have not 
yet been specified. In the former case, in contrast, the propositions cannot be 
true because all interpretations are counter-models. 
 
What seems to be a proof by reduction according to a superficial analysis may 
show up as a paradox according to a more thorough logical analysis. In this case, 
it is not the falsity of some axiom that is proven, but rather the impossibility to 
represent it by a proposition with well-defined truth conditions according to 
first-order logic. In the case of Russell's Paradox, it is proven that the so-called 
“relation of membership” cannot be represented by an atomic propositional 
function expressing an external, primitive relation between objects. Such a 
relation presumes that the objects satisfying the relation are identifiable 
independent of the relation. This criterion is not satisfied in the case of 
membership if a set is considered to be (or not to be) its own member. Such an 
understanding contradicts the principle of logical independence. In consequence, 
one cannot represent “x is (not) a member of y” by means of a propositional 
function (x). Thus, it is the substitution of (x) with x  x that must be 
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rejected in the first place. Such a substitution mistakenly confuses the 
grammatical form with the logical form of propositions. According to this kind 
of critique, the meaning of UCAS cannot be represented by some logical 
formula and even less so by the non-tautologous formula (UCAS). This is due 
to the fact that it does not make sense to assume well-defined propositional 
functions in terms of first-order logic that do not identify sets. Within this 
conception, it is not even possible to interpret a proper propositional function of 
logic such that it does not identify a set. Whatever does not identify a set is not a 
proper propositional function. To be a member of a set means to satisfy some 
propositional function identifying that set. Thus, what one intends to say by 
(UCAS) is quite right. Yet, (UCAS) cannot be articulated as a meaningful 
proposition within the logical symbolism because doing so would presume 
mistakenly that the relation between sets and propositional functions is external. 
The problems of “naïve” set theory do not arise before one makes use of a 
logical formalization naively expressing membership as a primitive relation 
between objects. Only a superficial analysis, “bedeviled” by surface grammar of 
ordinary language, makes such a deficient logical formalization of set theory 
possible. 
 
Within the framework of a theory of formalization, it is irrelevant to consider 
whether such a critique of the logical formalization of set theory is adequate. 
What is more important is that it is possible. It should not be excluded by 
presuming some model of formalization without discussing and arguing against 
its alternatives. In contrast to VCR and FCR, TC' articulates assumptions of 
logical formalization concerning the alleged meaning of ordinary propositions. 
Whether these assumptions are valid is unimportant for a theory of 
formalization. Yet, it is important to identify them as assumptions that can be 
questioned. Only TC' makes it possible to use logical formalization as a means 
of logically analyzing the meaning of propositions. In contrast, VCR and 
FCR presume that grammatically well-formed propositions have a truth value 
without considering their truth conditions. However, in order to assume that 
some proposition is true or false, it must be capable of being true or false. 
VCR and FCR do not consider this priority of the meaning of propositions 
over their truth value. Thus, they cannot rule out that nonsense is represented by 
logic. 
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